Wednesday, November 30, 2011

US Engagement Should Encourage Burma’s National Reconciliation

US Engagement Should Encourage Burma’s National Reconciliation


By Nehginpao Kipgen

November 30, 2011


US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton disembarks from an airplane upon her arrival in Naypyidaw on November 30, 2011. (Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)

On Dec. 1, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton begins a two-day visit to Burma, the first such visit by a top U.S. diplomat in half a century.

While some observers, mostly activists, argue that it is too early to embark on such a bold initiative as that of Clinton’s visit, others believe that it is important to seize a political opening in the reclusive country.

The two most important priorities of the Burmese government in international relations, in recent years, have centered on legitimacy and recognition. In pursuing these objectives, the immediate goal of Naypyidaw (Burma’s capital) was to convince the collective leadership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and to urge the U.S. government to ease, if not lift, sanctions.

Naypyidaw’s diplomatic efforts have positively paid off, and therefore, 2011 can be considered the most successful year of diplomacy in recent Burmese history.

Washington’s new level of engagement is augmented by the nineteenth ASEAN Summit’s unanimous agreement to award Burma the 2014 chairmanship of the regional bloc.

In 2006, Burma had to forego its rotating ASEAN chair because of intense pressure from rights groups and the international community, particularly the U.S. government. Some ASEAN members were also concerned that giving the chairmanship to Burma would tarnish the regional body’s international image.

Political Developments

There is a good reason to be cautiously optimistic about the recent developments in Burma and as President Obama has stated, there have been “flickers of progress” in the past few weeks. The greater question now is whether the Burmese government has a genuine intention for true democracy and national reconciliation.

A number of tangible political developments have driven a shift in U.S. foreign policy. Among others, the advice and recommendations of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) have played an important role in this development.

Besides visits by U.S. Special Envoy Derek Mitchell, both Obama and Clinton personally spoke to Suu Kyi and consulted her on how the United States should move forward with its engagement policy. Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership support Washington’s engagement approach.

Since her meeting with President Thein Sein on Aug. 19, Suu Kyi has toned down her rhetoric against the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)-led government, paving the way for political reconciliation. NLD is now prepared to re-register its defunct political party and Suu Kyi and her party members are expected to contest in the upcoming by-election.

Root Cause

Anyone who pursues an in-depth study of the Burmese history should understand the root cause of Burma’s decades-old problems. U.S. strategists and policymakers must understand that all major ethnic minorities in Burma fight against the central government in one way or another.
Democracy for one majority group alone cannot solve Burma’s political imbroglio.
Ethnic Karens began fighting against the Burmese government in 1949. What has compelled ethnic minorities to take up arms against the central government is a fundamental question that needs to be addressed for Burma to achieve peace and stability.

Prior to the country’s independence, Gen. Aung San was fully aware that a unified Burma could not be established if equality was not guaranteed for all ethnic nationalities, which were ruled under different administrative units by the British colonial administration.

In his attempt to clear the lingering doubts and suspicions of the British government and the frontier leaders, Aung San made a historic remark by stating that, “If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat.” This assurance was the basis on which the Union of Burma was formed at the Panglong conference in February 1947.

With the assassination of Aung San and his colleagues in July 1947, the dream of equality or autonomy has disappeared in Burmese politics. Burma’s first post-independence civilian government of Prime Minister U Nu failed to address the minorities’ concerns, and successive military governments have attempted to forcefully suppress it.

While the reconciliation between NLD and USDP is an important step, emphasis must now be given to the fundamental political problem. Democracy for one majority group alone cannot solve Burma’s political imbroglio.

Several decades of military operations have been unable to solve Burma’s minority problems. One most viable way to integrate ethnic minorities is to end military offensives against them, and begin a political dialogue based on mutual respect and a constitutional guarantee of equality for all citizens.

The United States should continue to set a benchmark for normalizing relations with the Burmese government. Naypyidaw’s commitment to democratization needs to be irreversible and should be demonstrated by releasing all remaining political prisoners; the government must be able to tolerate political dissent and respect the rights of every citizen to express opinions without fear.

When she travels to Naypyidaw and Rangoon for fact-finding and policy assessment, Clinton should underscore the need for addressing the problems of ethnic minorities. Because of her wide acceptance by minorities, Suu Kyi can play an important role in restoring mutual trust between the government and ethnic minorities.

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